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1 Introduction
This project came out of a surprise empirical ﬁnding. Figure 1 uses matched employer-
employee data from the UK over the period 2004-2016 and plots the average hourly
wage at each age for workers in low-skilled occupation, respectively in innovative and
non-innovative ﬁrms.1 We see that the average worker in low-skilled occupations
obtains a signiﬁcant wage premium from working in an innovative ﬁrm.
Figure 1: Average wage of workers in low-skilled occupations
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on 442,916 observations (228,613 on work in non-innovative ﬁrms and 154,303 in
innovative ﬁrms) in matched ASHE-BERD data; see Section 3 and Appendix A for more details about the data. The
ﬁgure plots the average log of hourly wage at each age from 18 to 64 for workers in low-skilled occupations (see Ap-
pendix A.2.3). The dashed curve is for workers in ﬁrms that do not report R&D expenditure, the solid curve for work-
ers in ﬁrms are ﬁrm that report positive R&D expenditure; see Appendix A.1. 95% conﬁdent intervals are included.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we develop a model of wage
bargaining with complementarity between high and low-skilled workers, to explain
why workers in some low-skilled occupations get a positive premium from working in
a more innovative ﬁrm. The main assumptions of the model are that: (i) a worker’s
productivity depends upon both hard skills and soft skills; (ii) more innovative ﬁrms
exhibit a higher degree of complementarity between workers in high-skilled occupation
and those workers in low-skilled occupation that have a high level of soft skills; (iii)
1The data are described in more details in Section 3. Innovative (resp. non innovative) ﬁrms
are deﬁned as ﬁrms with positive (resp. zero) R&D investments over the period.
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hard skills are largely observable whereas soft skills are less easy to detect ex-ante; (iv)
soft skills form a larger proportion of the abilities of workers in low-skilled occupations
(i.e. hard, veriﬁable skills are not that important in determining the wages of these
workers).
These assumptions in turn imply that workers in low-skilled occupations with high
soft skills command higher bargaining power in more innovative ﬁrms (as compared
to similar workers in less innovative ﬁrms). Workers in higher-skilled occupations
typically have observable qualiﬁcations, and their market value is primarily deter-
mined by their education and accumulated reputation, which are easily observable
and veriﬁable. A ﬁrm can replace a worker with a high proportion of hard skills by
another similar worker with limited downside risk, because their quality is observable.
In contrast, the key qualities of workers in some low-skilled occupations are soft skills
(non-cognitive) and can be diﬃcult to observe or develop, hence diﬃcult to replace.2
To gain intuition think of a worker in a low-skilled occupation, for example a
maintenance worker, a personal assistant or a sales telephonist, who shows outstand-
ing initiative and reliability. These attributes may be diﬃcult to measure and verify.
Yet, they allow the worker to perform tasks which complement the tasks performed
by workers in high-skilled occupations within the ﬁrm in the sense that if performed
well they can increase the productivity of the high-skilled employees, but if mistakes
are made by the worker in the low-skilled occupation these can be damaging to the
ﬁrm’s overall performance.
Our second contribution is to use matched employer-employee data from the UK,
augmented with information on R&D expenditures, to test the assumptions and main
predictions of the model. Namely: (i) workers in low-skilled occupations get a positive
and sizeable premium from working in a more innovative ﬁrm; (ii) workers in low-
skilled occupations exhibit on average a higher degree of complementarity with the
ﬁrm’s other assets in more innovative ﬁrms compared to in less innovative ﬁrms;
(iii) the wage premium to working in a more innovative ﬁrm for workers in low-
skilled occupations increases with the complementarity between their quality and the
ﬁrm’s other assets; (iv) workers in low-skilled occupations have longer tenure in more
innovative ﬁrms than in less innovative ﬁrms as more time will be spent by more
innovative ﬁrms to enhance (or learn about) these workers soft skills; (v) a more
2In our model the soft skills of workers in low-skilled occupations are largely unknown to the
ﬁrm at the point of hiring or they require that the ﬁrm invest in training. Our model is not therefore
a simple matching set up, and tenure increases the premium for workers in low-skilled occupations
more in more innovative ﬁrms.
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innovative ﬁrm will invest more in training its workers in low-skilled occupations to
increase their level of soft skills than a non-innovative ﬁrm; (vi) a more innovative
ﬁrm will outsource a higher fraction of tasks which involve lower complementarity of
workers in low-skilled occupations with the ﬁrm’s other assets.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. First, there is the literature on
wage inequality and skill-biased technical change (e.g. see Acemoglu, 2002; Goldin
and Katz, 2010, Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Krusell et al., 2000). Our ﬁnding that the
premium to working in more innovative ﬁrms is high for workers in some low-skilled
occupations is not at odds with the view that technical change has become increasingly
skill-biased over the past thirty ﬁve years. Indeed, we ﬁnd that more innovative ﬁrms
outsource a higher fraction of tasks performed by workers in low-skilled occupations,
but presumably they keep those workers in low-skilled occupations with high soft
skills and which are more essential to the ﬁrm. Thus Akerman et al. (2015) study the
impact of the adoption of broadband internet on wages, and ﬁnd that overall workers
in low-skill occupations beneﬁt less from the new technology, even though the quality
of some workers in low-skill occupations and the tasks they perform remain valuable.
Second, there is the labor and wage literature (Gibbons and Katz, 1992, Groshen,
1991, Abowd et al., 1999 and Bonhomme et al., 2019 among others), which empha-
sizes that ﬁrm heterogeneity plays a large role in explaining wage diﬀerences across
workers; however, there is little consensus in explaining which features of the ﬁrm
account for such variation.3 This literature has established that there is considerable
wage inequality between seemingly similar workers, and that this inequality is in turn
correlated with the ﬁrm that employs these workers (this is typically captured by a
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect).4 Less is known, however, about what drives these cross-ﬁrm dif-
ferences in wages, particularly for workers in low-skilled occupations. We highlight
one channel, namely the interplay between the ﬁrm’s innovativeness, and the com-
3For example, Card et al. (2016) assume that ﬁrm heterogeneity arises through TFP, but do
not model what drives these diﬀerences in TFP. Other studies report a link between productivity
and wage policy (Cahuc et al., 2006 and Barth et al., 2016 among others) and Song et al. (2018)
consistently ﬁnd that “between ﬁrm inequality” accounts for the majority of the total increase in
income inequality between 1981 and 2013 in the US. A recent trend of this literature is to link the
aggregate dispersion in wages to productivity dispersion across ﬁrms (Barth et al., 2016, Dunne et al.,
2004). Matched employer-employee data are often leveraged to investigate whether this correlation
represents diﬀerences in workers selected into diﬀerent ﬁrms, or the same type of worker being paid
a diﬀerent wage depending on the ﬁrm they work in (see Card et al., 2016 for a review). Abowd
et al. (1999) pioneered the use of the two-way ﬁxed eﬀect model (ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed eﬀects) to
study the eﬀect on wages when a worker moves between ﬁrms.
4Card et al. (2016) report that, “most studies that control for worker heterogeneity find wage-
productivity elasticities in the range 0.05-0.15.”
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plementarity between the (soft) skills of workers in low-skilled occupations and the
ﬁrm’s other assets.
Third, our paper relates to the literature on innovation and growth. That innova-
tion should play a key role in explaining cross-ﬁrm wage diﬀerences, is in line with the
endogenous growth literature (e.g. see Romer, 1990; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992),
where innovation-led growth is motivated by the prospect of rents. And indeed recent
papers in this literature look at the eﬀects of innovation on income inequality using
aggregate data (e.g. Aghion et al., 2018a; and Akcigit et al., 2017). Taking a more
microeconomic approach, Kline et al. (2018) for the US and Aghion et al. (2018b)
for Finland, use administrative tax data merged with patent data to look at the indi-
vidual returns from innovation to the inventors and to their co-workers. Both papers
ﬁnd signiﬁcant returns to innovation, most of which accrue to other employees or
stakeholders within the inventor’s ﬁrm.5 We contribute to this literature by focusing
on the returns to soft skills for some workers in low-skilled occupations in more versus
less innovative ﬁrms, and on how innovativeness aﬀects the degree of complementar-
ity between these workers and the ﬁrm’s other assets (including workers in high-skill
occupations).
Finally, we draw on the literature on wage inequality and the organization of the
ﬁrm (e.g. see Kremer, 1993, Kremer and Maskin, 1996, Garicano, 2000 and Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). We contribute to this literature by linking the ﬁrm’s
innovativeness to the complementarity between workers in low-skill occupations who
have high soft skills and the ﬁrm’s other assets.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we develop the
theoretical framework. In Section 3 we present our data and empirical methodology,
and establish that more innovative ﬁrms pay higher wages to observationally similar
workers, particularly in low-skilled occupations. In Section 4 we develop our measure
of the complementarity between the ﬁrm’s other assets and workers in low-skilled
occupations. We do this at the occupation level using the O*NET data (based on
workers and ﬁrms in the US). We provide evidence consistent with the view that the
wage premium of workers in low-skilled occupations from working in more innovative
ﬁrms increases with the workers’ soft skills and with the complementarity between
these soft skills and the ﬁrm’s other assets. In Section 5 we test the additional
5Kline et al. (2018) ﬁnd that workers capture 29 cents of every dollar of patent-induced operating
surplus. Aghion et al. (2018b) ﬁnd that inventors get only 7.9% of the total gains, entrepreneurs get
over 44.5% of the total gains and blue-collar workers get about 25.7% of the gains.
5
predictions from the model and discuss the robustness of our main ﬁndings. Section
6 collects our concluding remarks.
2 A Model
In this section we develop a model in which: (i) workers productivity depends upon
both, hard skills and soft skills and (ii) more innovative ﬁrms exhibit a higher degree
of complementarity between workers in high and low-skilled occupations. A key fea-
ture of the model is that hard skills are largely observable (e.g. those are typically
more educated employees, whose market value is largely determined by their educa-
tion and accumulated reputation), whereas soft skills are less easy to detect ex-ante
or require more training. Moreover, soft skills account for a larger fraction of workers’
overall abilities for workers in low-skilled occupations than for workers in high-skilled
occupations. Workers in low-skilled occupations with relatively high soft skills draw
bargaining power for two reasons. First from the fact that they are more complemen-
tary to workers in high-skilled occupations. Second from the fact that it is hard for
the ﬁrm to ﬁnd alternative workers in low-skilled occupations with relatively high soft
skills: instead, ﬁrms need time to ﬁnd or train workers to get equal levels of soft skills.
As a result, workers in low-skilled occupations with high soft skills will command a
higher wage in more innovative ﬁrms. If we further assume that the ﬁrm’s output
suﬀers more from replacing a worker in a low-skilled occupation with high soft skill
than from replacing a worker in a high-skilled occupation, then the wage diﬀerential
between workers in low-skilled occupations in more versus less innovative ﬁrms will
be higher than the wage diﬀerential between workers in high-skilled occupations in
more versus less innovative ﬁrms. We now proceed to formalize our argument.
2.1 Model setup
Production function
We consider a representative ﬁrm which we model as a two-layer hierarchy with
workers in high and low-skilled occupations. For simplicity we assume that there is
one employee in a high-skilled occupation who monitors a continuum of tasks, each
of which is performed by a diﬀerent worker in a low-skilled occupation.6 Tasks are
ranked according to the degree of complementarity λ ∈ [0, 1] between workers in high
6See Appendix C.4 for an extension with more than one worker of each type in each task.
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and low-skilled occupations. If Q denotes the overall quality of the employee in the
high-skilled occupation, and q = q(λ) denotes the overall quality of the worker in the
low-skilled occupation on task λ, then the output produced on that task is assumed to
be determined by the following “partially O’Ring” production function (see Kremer,
1993 and Kremer and Maskin, 1996):
f(λ, q,Q) = λqQ+ (1− λ) (q +Q) .
The value λ = 0 corresponds to full substitutability between the qualities of the
employees in the high and low-skilled occupations. The value λ = 1 corresponds to
the case where the qualities of the employees in the high and low-skilled occupations
are fully complementary.
The ﬁrm’s total output is then taken to be a weighted sum of the outputs on the
individual tasks. Formally, if φ(λ) denotes the weight function on tasks, which we
allow to vary with the degree of innovativeness z of the ﬁrm, we denote the ﬁrm’s
aggregate production by:
F (~q,Q) =
∫ 1
0
f(λ, q(λ), Q)φ(λ, z)dλ.
where:
~q = (q(λ))λ∈[0,1] and
∫ 1
0
φ(λ, z)dλ = 1.
Wage negotiation
For each task λ, the ﬁrm engages in separate wage negotiations with the workers
respectively in the high and low-skilled occupations on that task. This negotiation
leads to the equilibrium wage wq(λ) for the worker in the low-skilled occupation and
to wQ for the worker in the high-skilled occupation. We denote by βL (resp. βH)
the fraction of the ﬁrm’s net surplus that accrues to the worker in the low-skilled
occupation (resp. high-skilled occupation) where we assume: βL ≤ βH < 1.
Wages within the ﬁrm are determined by Nash bargaining following Stole and
Zwiebel (1996). In this bargaining, the ﬁrm has the opportunity of replacing the
employee in the high-skilled occupation – whose quality is Q – by an outside high-
skilled employee with ex-ante expected quality QL. Similarly, on each task λ, the ﬁrm
has the outside option of replacing the worker in the low-skilled occupation on that
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task - this worker has quality q(λ) and is paid wage wq(λ) - by an outside worker
with reservation quality qL and reservation wage wL.7
We assume that it is easier for the ﬁrm to ﬁnd a substitute for the employee in
the high-skilled occupation than for the employee in the low-skilled occupation. The
underlying idea is that soft skills account for a higher share of the overall quality for a
workers in these low-skilled occupations than for workers in high-skilled occupations,
and that soft skills are harder to detect ex-ante or to generate via training than hard
skill. Formally, this leads us to assume that:
Q−QL < q(λ)− qL,
for all λ, where we also assume that Q > QL >> q(λ) > qL > 1.
Substitute workers in low-skilled and high-skilled occupations are paid wages wL
and wH respectively, which we assume to be exogenous. Similarly, the incumbent
workers in the high and low-skilled occupations have outside options w¯L and w¯H ,
which are also exogenous. We assume: wL < wH and w¯L << w¯H .
The ﬁrm’s total wage bill is then equal to
W (~q) =
∫ 1
0
wq(λ)dλ+ wQ,
Net profits
The ﬁrm’s ex-post proﬁt is equal to:
Π˜(~q) ≡ F (~q)−W (~q).
We assume that prior to the wage negotiation, the ﬁrm can learn about or train
the worker in the low-skilled occupation on each task λ, so that the expected quality
of the worker moves up from qL to some higher quality level q(λ) at a quadratic cost.
The ﬁrm’s ex-ante training investment will seek to maximize ex-post proﬁt minus the
training cost, namely:
Π˜(~q)−
∫ 1
0
C(λ) (q(λ)− qL)2 dλ,
with respect to ~q = (q(λ))λ.
7An alternative interpretation is that absent a wage agreement the worker in the low-skilled
occupation chooses to underperform at quality level qL.
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Innovativeness and complementarity
We assume that more innovative ﬁrms display higher average complementarity be-
tween the qualities of workers in high and low-skilled occupations across tasks. More
formally, we assume that
Eφ (λ, z) =
∫ 1
0
λφ(λ, z)dλ
increases with the innovativeness measure z.
Here are two tractable cases which will allow us to nicely develop our intuitions:
Example 1. Suppose that φ(λ, z) = (z + 1)λz. In that case we have:
Eφ [λ] = 1− 1
z + 2
,
which increases with the innovation intensity z.
Example 2. (“Toy Case”): Suppose that: φ(λ, z) is equal to 1 only for λ = λz ≡ zzmax
(where zmax denotes the maximum value z can take) and to zero for λ 6= λz. In that
case:
Eφ [λ] =
z
zmax
,
which again increases with the innovation intensity z.
2.2 Solving the model
To simplify the analysis we henceforth assume that the bargaining surplus is split
equally between the ﬁrm and each worker (βH = βL = 1) and that the training cost
parameter C is independent of the task.
2.2.1 The toy case
Here we consider the toy case where φ(λ, z) = 1 if λ = λz and 0 otherwise. In this
case, the ﬁrm with innovativeness level z has only one task λ = λz performed (other
tasks are irrelevant to the ﬁrm since they have no impact on its production).
Equilibrium wages in the low-skilled occupation The ﬁrm’s net surplus from
employing a worker with quality q in a low-skilled occupation on the unique task λz,
is equal to:
SF = [λzQ+ (1− λz)] (q − qL)− wq + wL.
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The surplus of the worker in the low-skilled occupation on that task is equal to
SLS = wq − w¯L,
where w¯L is the worker’s outside option.
Since we assume βL = 1, the equilibrium wage of the worker in the low-skilled
occupation on the unique task λz is determined by equalizing the two surplus, hence:
wq(λz, q, Q) =
q − qL
2
(λz(Q− 1) + 1) + wL + w¯
L
2
(1)
Equilibrium wages in the high-skilled occupation Replicating the same argu-
ment for the worker in the high-skilled occupation, we obtain the following expression
for the equilibrium wage of the employee in the high-skilled occupation:
wQ(λz, q, Q) =
Q−QL
2
(λz(q − 1) + 1) + wH + w¯
H
2
(2)
Optimal training decision Having determined the equilibrium wages wQ and wq
for given q, Q and z, we now move backward and consider the ﬁrm’s optimal choice
of qualities (q∗(λz) = q∗, Q∗), where we impose
q∗ ∈ [qL, q];Q∗ ∈ [QL, Q].
Namely, the ﬁrm chooses (q∗, Q∗) by solving:
(q∗, Q∗) = argmax
qL<q<q QL<Q<Q
{
f(λz, q, Q)− wQ(λz, q, Q)− wq(λz, q, Q)− C(q − qL)2
}
With respect toQ, the problem is linear which leads to the corner solutionQ∗ = Q.
With respect to q, the problem is concave so that by ﬁrst order condition we obtain:
q∗(λz) = qL +
1
4C
[λz(QL − 1) + 1] ,
where we implicitly assume that this value is lower than q. 8 Note that q∗ is increasing
with λz, and therefore with z: that is, the optimal level of training of a worker in a
low-skilled occupation is higher in a more innovative ﬁrm.
8 A suﬃcient condition is that q > qL+
QL
4C
, which is true as long as training costs are suﬃciently
large.
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Innovativeness and high versus low-skilled occupation wages The equilib-
rium wage of the worker in the low-skilled occupation on task z, up to a constant, is
equal to:
wq(z) ≡ wq(λz, q∗(λz), Q∗)
and similarly, the equilibrium wage of the worker in the high-skilled occupation on
task z, up to a constant, is equal to:
wQ(z) ≡ wQ(λz, q∗(λz), Q∗).
We can then establish:
Proposition 1. The premium to working in a more innovative task-firm is higher
for workers in low-skilled occupations than for workers in high-skilled occupations:
dwq(z)
dz
>
dwQ(z)
dz
Proof. See Appendix C.1
The proposition immediately results from the facts that: (i) in more innovative
ﬁrms the complementarity is higher between the worker in the high-skilled occupation
and the workers in the low-skilled occupation with training (i.e. with high soft skill);
(ii) optimal training of workers in low-skilled occupations is higher in more innovative
ﬁrms so that replacing the current worker in the low-skilled occupation by an outside
worker has a more negative impact for such ﬁrms.
2.2.2 The general case
We now consider the case where the ﬁrm covers a whole range of tasks with a contin-
uous density distribution φ(λ, z) over tasks λ. We assume that φ(λ, z) is increasing
in both λ and the innovativeness level z. We then establish:
Proposition 2. The average premium across tasks to working in more innovative
firms, is higher for workers in low-skilled occupations than for workers in high-skilled
occupations:
dwq
dz
>
dwQ
dz
Proof. See Appendix C.2
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2.2.3 Outsourcing
Assume that the ﬁrm is subject to an overall time constraint (or “limited attention”
constraint) for training or screening. Formally:∫ 1
0
(q(λ)− qL) dλ ≤ T,
so that ex-ante the ﬁrm maximizes
Π˜(~q)−
∫ 1
0
C(λ) (q(λ)− qL)2 dλ
subject to that constraint.
Then if the above time constraint is binding, for suﬃciently low λ it is optimal for
the ﬁrm to ﬁx q∗(λ) = qL, which we interpret as outsourcing the corresponding task.
The following proposition establishes that the cutoﬀ value of λ below which the ﬁrm
outsources tasks increases with the ﬁrm’s degree of innovativeness z.
Proposition 3. There exists a cutoff value λ¯(z) such that for all tasks λ ≤ λ¯(z), then
q∗(λ) = qL. In other words all tasks λ ≤ λ¯(z) are outsourced. Moreover, we have
dλ¯(z)
dz
> 0.
That is, more frontier firms outsource a higher fraction of tasks.
Proof. See Appendix C.3
In the case where φ(λ, z) = λz(z+1), it is possible to derive close-form expressions
for λ¯(z) for integer values of z (see Appendix C.3). Figure 2 shows the cases z =
0, 1 and 2.
2.3 From model to data
In the next sections, we confront the following assumptions and predictions of the
model with data.
Fact 1: Workers in low-skilled occupations get a positive premium from working
in a more innovative ﬁrm.
Fact 2: In more innovative ﬁrms workers in low-skilled occupations exhibit on
average a higher degree of complementarity with the ﬁrm’s other assets.
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Figure 2: λ¯ as a function of z
λ
4C(T − qL)
λ¯(0) λ¯(1) ¯λ(2)
Fact 2: There is a wage premium to working in a more innovative ﬁrm for
workers in low-skilled occupations, which is driven by the complementarity between
their quality and the ﬁrm’s other assets.
Fact 3: Workers in low-skilled occupations should have longer tenure in more
innovative ﬁrms than in less innovative ﬁrms (as more time and money is invested in
getting them from qL to q∗).
Fact 4: A more innovative ﬁrm will invest more in training its workers in low-
skilled occupations than a non innovative ﬁrm (this is captured by the fact that q−qL
is an increasing function of z in the model).
Fact 5: A more innovative ﬁrm will outsource a higher fraction of tasks which
involve lower complementarity between workers in low-skilled occupations and the
ﬁrm’s other assets.
3 The innovation premium for workers in low-skill
occupations
In this section we describe our data and empirical approach to establish that more
innovative ﬁrms pay higher wages to observationally similar workers, particularly to
workers in low-skilled occupations.
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3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We use novel matched employer-employee data for the UK to which we have also
matched information on R&D expenditure; we consider the period 2004 to 2016.
The employee data come from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE),
which is a random sample of 1% of the UK working population. We match this
to the Business expenditures on Research and Development (BERD) survey, which
is a census for ﬁrms with more than 400 employees. These data are longitudinal -
we follow the same workers over time - and are recorded at the establishment level,
with information on which establishments are part of the same ﬁrm. We focus on
private companies (excluding the public sector, charities, etc) that have 400 or more
employees. We use information on 164,345 employees who work in 6,941 ﬁrms, giving
us a total of 680,649 observations. Further details on the data are given in Appendix
A.
We classify occupations by the average required skill level based on qualiﬁca-
tions, see details in Appendix A.2.3. We distinguish between low-skilled occupations,
which require minimal formal education and training; intermediate-skilled occupa-
tions, which typically require the equivalent of a high-school education and include
trades, specialist clericals, associate professionals; and high-skilled occupations, which
typically require advanced training or a university degree and include engineers and
managers.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the wages paid to workers in innovative ﬁrms
compared to those working in non-innovative ﬁrms at all ages and even after control-
ling for a range of observable worker and ﬁrm characteristics. Figure 3 shows that
the average wage of workers increases with the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity; average wages
are over twice as high in the most R&D intensive ﬁrms compared to ﬁrms that do no
R&D.
This result echoes those of Van Reenen (1996), who showed that innovative ﬁrms
pay higher wages on average, using information on publicly listed UK ﬁrms. Another
way to see this is by comparing the share of workers who work in a ﬁrm that does
R&D at diﬀerent points in the wage distribution; this increases from just over 20%
for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, to over 50% at the 80th percentile
of the distribution (see Figure A4 in Appendix A.5).
Workers in more R&D intensive ﬁrms have diﬀerent characteristics to those work-
ing in less R&D intensive ﬁrms. Table 1 shows that the former are more likely to be
males, work full-time and have longer tenure within the ﬁrm. R&D ﬁrms also diﬀer
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Figure 3: Wages and R&D intensity
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the average value of the log hourly wage against the average value of R&D intensity
(log(1+R/L) where R is total R&D expenditures and L is total employment in the ﬁrm. R&D intensity ranges from
0 (no R&D expenditures) to around 12. R&D intensity if plotted by dividing ﬁrm into 20 percentiles of the R&D in-
tensity distribution, with one category for non innovative ﬁrms; the number shown on the horizontal axis is the mean
R&D intensity in that percentile. Wages are deﬁned in Appendix A.2.2. R&D intensity is deﬁned in Appendix A.1.
from non-R&D ﬁrms in that they have a larger workforce. All of these might aﬀect
the wages of workers in these ﬁrms. In Appendix A we provide further descriptive
statistics of the key variables.
3.2 The wage premia to working in more innovative firms
In this subsection we provide evidence that more innovative ﬁrms pay higher wages
to observationally similar workers and, in particular, that workers in low-skilled oc-
cupations get a positive premium from working in a more innovative ﬁrm.
We estimate the following relationship:
ln(wijkft) = βR˜ft + gT (Tift) + gA(Ai) + αFFift + αSSift + γi + ηt + eijkft, (3)
where i indexes individual, j occupation, k labor market, f ﬁrm and t years; wijkft is
the hourly wage, and R˜ft = ln(1+Rft) is R&D intensity.9 Tift is the worker’s tenure
9Rft is deﬁned as R&D expenditures divided by the number of employees; we use ln(1 + Rft)
to accommodate values of zero in ﬁrms that do not do any R&D; it is almost equal to ln(Rft) given
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Table 1: Firm characteristics
Innovative ﬁrms Non-innovative ﬁrms All
Employment 2,796 2,222 2,396
Hourly Wage (£) 15.8 12.9 13.8
Share of Male (%) 68 57 60
Share of full-time (%) 90 77 81
Workers in high-skilled occupations (%) 30 18 22
Workers in low-skilled occupations (%) 52 64 60
Age (years) 40.5 38.3 38.9
Tenure (years) 8.9 5.9 6.8
Workers 71,847 135,184 164,345
Firms 2,299 6,184 6,941
Firms-years 12,711 29,158 41,869
Workers-ﬁrms-years 261,513 419,136 680,649
Notes: Innovative ﬁrms are those that report any R&D expenditures over the period. Employment is the average number of
workers in the ﬁrm over all years. Wages are deﬁned in Appendix A.2.2. Deﬁnitions of high and low-skill occupations are given in
Appendix A.2.3.
(length of time working in the ﬁrm), Ai is the age of the worker, Fift is an indicator of
whether the job is full-time (as opposed to part-time), Sft is the number of employees
in the ﬁrm, and ηt represent common time eﬀects. Finally, eijkft captures remaining
idiosyncratic time varying unobservables.
Table 2 presents our estimates of equation (3). In columns (1)-(3) we include
workers in all occupations; the columns diﬀer in the controls for unobservables that
we include. In column (1) we include labor market eﬀects interacted with time eﬀects
(“Geo-Year”). Labour markets are deﬁned as a travel to work area; there are around
240 such areas in the UK, see Appendix A.3. The coeﬃcient estimate of 0.030 suggests
that workers in the most R&D intensive ﬁrms earn nearly 40% more than workers in
ﬁrms that do no R&D.10 Compared to Figure 3, we see that controlling for workers
and ﬁrms characteristics accounts for a substantial part of the diﬀerences we saw in
the raw data.
the magnitude of R&D expenditure, so we can interpret β as the elasticity of wage with respect to
R&D intensity. In Section 5.5 we show robustness of our results to alternative functional forms and
alternative measures of R&D.
10 This is exp(predicted wage at max(R˜ft)) minus exp(predicted wage at
min(R˜ft)))/exp(predicted wage at min(R˜ft) )=0.38, where the predictions use the coeﬃ-
cient estimates from column (1) of Table 2, max(R˜ft) denotes the average R&D intensity level of
ﬁrms in the highest quantile (see Table A1) and min(R˜ft) = 0 (non innovative ﬁrms).
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Table 2: Relationship between wages and R&D intensity
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Skill level All All All Low Int High All
R˜ft 0.030*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Int-skill 0.002***
(0.001)
× Low-skill 0.006***
(0.001)
Tenure 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.057*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.002)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.032*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.005** 0.001 0.003 -0.007***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender 0.152*** 0.140***
(0.006) (0.004)
Full-time 0.241*** 0.069*** 0.007 -0.009* -0.079*** -0.102*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005)
Low-skill dummy -0.162***
(0.006)
Int-skill dummy -0.077***
(0.004)
Geo-year X
Geo-Occupation-year X
Individual X X X X X
Year X X X X X
R2 0.384 0.625 0.886 0.769 0.847 0.880 0.888
Observations 680,583 669,899 634,542 399,690 100,989 114,953 634,542
Notes: The dependent variable is log of wage which is deﬁned in Appendix A.2.2. R˜ft = ln(1 + Rft) where Rft is total R&D expenditures of
ﬁrm f during year t divided by employment. Other covariates deﬁnitions are given in Table A7. Column 1 includes year-labor market ﬁxed eﬀects,
column 2 includes year-labor market-occupation eﬀects, column 3-7 include year and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. In column 3-7 Age and the Gender
aren’t identiﬁed because of additive worker and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are reported
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of signiﬁcance.
In column (2) of Table 2 we add occupation-geo-year eﬀects using the two-digit
level of the occupation code (25 occupations). This reduces the coeﬃcient on R&D
intensity by about half, the coeﬃcient estimate of 0.016 suggests that workers in the
most R&D intensive ﬁrms earn around 20% more than workers in ﬁrms that do no
R&D.
In column (3) we add worker eﬀects, (γi). These are meant to capture permanent
unobserved attributes that workers carry across ﬁrms. These are important and con-
trol for selection on unobserved permanent individual characteristics. Higher quality
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Figure 4: Average wage of workers in high and intermediate-skilled occupations
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(b) Intermediate-skill
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the average log of hourly wage at each age from 18 to 64 for work-
ers in diﬀerent skill level occupations. The dashed curve is for workers in non-innovative
ﬁrms, the solid curve for workers in innovative ﬁrms. Innovative ﬁrms are ﬁrms that re-
port at least £1 in R&D expenditures over the period. 95% conﬁdence intervals are included.
workers might select into higher quality ﬁrms. This speciﬁcation accounts for endoge-
nous selection and matching based on the individual eﬀect (γi). We drop occupation
and labor market eﬀects as we do not observe many workers who move across occupa-
tions or labor markets (although including them has negligible eﬀect on our results).
This reduces the coeﬃcient on R&D intensity to 0.006, which implies that workers
in the most R&D intensive ﬁrms earn around 7% more than workers in ﬁrms that do
no R&D, after controlling for all these diﬀerences. Compared to the estimates in col-
umn (3) the estimates without worker eﬀects considerably over-estimate the impact
of R&D intensity on wages,11 however, the premium from working in an innovative
ﬁrm remain statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
Figure 1 showed that workers in low-skilled occupations earned higher wages on
average in innovative ﬁrms; is that also true for workers in high and intermediate-
skilled occupations? Figure 4 shows that the within-skill group variance of wages
across ﬁrms is relatively less important for workers in high and intermediate-skilled
occupations than for workers in low-skilled occupations. Workers in higher skilled
occupations earn the highest wages, and these wages are on average similar across
ﬁrms that are more versus less R&D intensive. In contrast, workers in low-skilled
occupations earn substantially more if they work in a ﬁrm that has higher R&D
intensity. Hence the wage gradient with respect to R&D intensity is largest for workers
in low-skilled occupations.
11 Results using alternative ﬁxed eﬀects and other measures of R&D are shown in Section 5.5.
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In order to see whether the wage premia shown in Figures 1 and 4 are robust
to controlling for other diﬀerences in workers and ﬁrms, we separate workers by the
skill level of their occupations. Column (4) of Table 2 shows estimates for the sample
of workers in low-skilled occupations, column (5) for intermediate-skilled occupations
and column (6) for high-skilled occupations. The positive coeﬃcient on R&D intensity
is statistically signiﬁcant for low and intermediate-skill categories and is strongest
for the low-skilled occupations. In column (7) we pool all skill levels and allow
the intercept and coeﬃcient on R&D intensity to vary with the skill level of the
occupation. The premium is highest for workers in low-skilled occupations.
The estimates in column (7) suggest that on average workers in low-skilled occupa-
tions in the most R&D intensive ﬁrms earn 6% more than workers in ﬁrms that do no
R&D; and this is more than for workers in high or intermediate-skilled occupations.
These results conﬁrm that on average workers in low-skill occupations obtain a
positive wage premium from working in a more innovative ﬁrm. This remains true
after controlling for observable and non time-varying unobservable characteristics;
this in turns validates Fact 1 from our model.
One remark to conclude this section: even though workers in high-skill occupa-
tions do not seem to enjoy much of a wage premium from working in a more R&D
intensive ﬁrm, at the same time more innovative ﬁrms hire fewer workers in low-skilled
occupations and more workers in high-skilled occupations. Table A9 in the Appendix
shows that moving from the least to the most R&D intensive ﬁrm increases the share
of workers in high-skilled occupations from 19% to 60%. Thus overall, workers in
high-skilled occupations are those who beneﬁt the most from working in a more in-
novative environment. That we do not observe sizeable wage premia for workers in
high-skill occupations employed in more innovative ﬁrms is explained in our model by
the fact that hard skills are more easily veriﬁable and therefore the labor market is
more competitive for these workers (we come back to this point in the next section).12
12As noted earlier, our contrast is diﬀerent to that studied in Kline et al. (2018). They study
innovative ﬁrms and ask which types of workers gain from the award of a patent using workers in
ﬁrms where a patent is refused as a control group. They ﬁnd that it is the high-skilled occupations
in innovative ﬁrms that receive a larger share of the rent when the patent is approved.
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4 Measuring complementarity and the return to soft
skills
Our model in Section 2 relies on the distinction between hard skills and soft skills.
Hard skills are reasonably easy to observe, for example, by formal qualiﬁcations. Soft
skills are more diﬃcult to observe, both for us as researchers and for employers. In our
model, what drives the returns to working in an R&D ﬁrm for workers in low-skilled
occupations is that some of these workers have soft skills and these are important for
the ﬁrm, i.e. more complementary to the ﬁrm’s other assets. By their very nature
these soft skills are diﬃcult to observe and measure. Note that we are not claiming
that the absolute importance of soft skills is higher for workers in low-skilled occupa-
tions than for workers in high-skilled occupations. Instead, our model is predicated on
the idea that soft skills are relatively more important for workers in low-skilled occu-
pations. Consider the example of a researcher and an administrative assistant. Even
if the average researcher turns out to enjoy higher soft skills than the administrative
assistant, yet her income will be mostly determined by the university she graduated
from and more importantly by her track record of publications and inventions: all
these elements are veriﬁable (they are typically included in the researcher’s CV). In
other words, soft skills will be relatively unimportant in determining the researcher’s
overall income. In contrast, an administrative assistant might have lower soft skills
than researchers on average. Yet these will represent a higher share of her value to
the ﬁrm, especially if they are more essential to the ﬁrm, and therefore will play a
more important role in determining the assistant’s overall income. These will also be
diﬃcult to observe, but will be revealed progressively over time.
4.1 Measuring complementarity
How can we measure the complementarity between the ﬁrm’s other assets and workers
in low-skilled occupations for each task? We do so at the occupation level using the
O*NET data. The O*NET data provide detailed information on the characteristics
of occupations based on surveys of workers and experts in the US (more detailed are
given in Appendix A.6). We work at the 3 digit SOC 2010 occupation level, where
we can reasonably match US occupations to UK occupations.
The O*NET data contain a number of questions that are related to the idea of
complementarity, which in the model is captured by λ. We select seven dimensions
that we believe are most relevant for our purposes and which we aggregate into a
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single score using principle components analysis. Speciﬁcally, workers are surveyed
across occupations and asked to grade each dimension from 1 (when this dimension is
not relevant to the workers’ occupation) to 5 (when this dimension is very relevant to
the workers’ occupation). We run a principal component analysis eigen decomposition
and consider the ﬁrst eigen axis as our measure of complementarity λ; this explains
more than 57% of the total variance from all the dimensions. Table 3 presents these
seven dimensions and their relative importance in the deﬁnition of λ.
Table 3: O*NET dimensions contributing to λ
O*NET Dimension Weight
How important is being very exact of highly accurate in performing
the job?
0.1057
How serious would be the result usually be if the worker made a
mistake that was not readily correctable?
0.3262
What results do your decisions usually have on other people or the
image or reputation or ﬁnancial resources of your employer?
0.4371
How important is it to work with others in a group or team in this
job?
0.3793
How responsible is the worker for work outcomes and results of other
workers?
0.4027
How important is it to coordinate or lead others in accomplishing
work activities in this job?
0.4453
How important is the following skill for your job: “Adjusting actions
in relation to others’ action”?
0.4325
Notes: Results from a Principal Component Analysis of the seven dimension taken from O*NET at the occu-
pation level. The weight correspond to the decomposition of the ﬁrst axis.
Table 4: Mean λ by skill level of occupation
Skill level mean (sd) λ
Low 0.34 (0.13)
Medium 0.60 (0.18)
High 0.65 (0.15)
We standardized our resulting λ measure so that it lies between 0 and 1. On aver-
age, employees in low-skilled occupations work on a task with a λ equal to 0.34 (see
Table 4). In what follows, we refer to a high lambda occupation as an occupation in
the top 33% of the distribution of lambdas, and similarly to a low lambda occupation
as an occupation in the bottom 33%. Following that terminology, 49% of workers are
in low lambda occupations, 33% on the middle lambda occupations, and 18% in high
lambda occupations.
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4.2 Workers in high-lambda low-skilled occupations are more
essential in more innovative firms
Here we show that more innovative ﬁrms have a higher share of workers in low-skilled
occupations that are associated with a high value of λ (hence displaying greater
complementarity with workers in high-skilled occupations) than less innovative ﬁrms.
More speciﬁcally, in Figure 5 we see that the share of high lambda occupations among
low-skilled occupations essentially increases with the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity; this vin-
dicates our ﬁrst conjecture (Fact 2 of the model). This share increases from around
10% for ﬁrms that do no R&D up to around one third for the most innovative ﬁrms.
Figure 5: Share of workers in low-skilled occupations that are in high lambda occu-
pations, by R&D intensity
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Notes: This Figure reports the average share of workers in high lambda occupations among
workers in low-skilled occupations against &D intensity. R&D intensity if plotted by divid-
ing ﬁrm into 20 percentiles of the R&D intensity distribution, with one category for non innova-
tive ﬁrms; the number shown on the horizontal axis is the mean R&D intensity in that percentile.
In line with our model, we expect workers in these high lambda and low-skill
occupations to have a higher wage in more innovative ﬁrms. This is indeed what
Figure 6(a) hints at; this ﬁgure shows a clearly positive correlation between the log
of hourly wage and the average level of complementarity of tasks in the ﬁrm, for
innovative ﬁrms. Doing the same exercise but replacing the logarithm of hourly wage
by the tenure in the ﬁrm also yields a positive correlation, as shown in Figure 6(b).
22
Figure 6: Hourly wage and tenure against lambda for low-skilled occupation workers
in innovative ﬁrms
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Notes: These ﬁgures show the average log of hourly wage (left-hand side ﬁgure) and tenure in years (right-
hand side ﬁgure) for workers in low-skilled occupations who work in innovative ﬁrms against the level λ.
4.3 The return to soft skills in more innovative firms
In this subsection we provide evidence consistent with the view that the wage premium
for workers in low-skilled occupations from working in more innovative ﬁrms increases
with the workers’ soft skills and the complementarity between these soft skills and
the ﬁrm’s other assets.
Suppose that the level of soft skills for individual i is represented by ψi. To allow
for the value of soft skills to diﬀer across ﬁrms depending on their R&D intensity we
augment wage equation (1) and write:
ln(wijkft) = βRft + φj(Rft, Tift, ψi) + gT (Tift) + gA(Ai) + αFFift + αSSift + γi + ηt + eijkft, (4)
where φj(Rft, Tift, ψi) is included to capture the marginal impact of soft skills on the
wage of workers in low-skilled occupations in an innovative ﬁrm. From our model, we
know that this eﬀect increases with the degree of complementarity λj for occupation
j and the R&D intensity of the ﬁrm. In what follows, we use the following parametric
representation of φj:
φj(Rft, Tift, ψi) = α1λj.Rft.Tift + α2λj.Rft + α3Rft.Tift + α4λj + ψi.
This measures the return for worker i in occupation j with degree of complementarity
λj, with soft skills ψi, with tenure Tift in ﬁrm f, and where Rft is the R&D intensity
of ﬁrm f at time t (as before i indexes individual, j occupation, k labor market, f
ﬁrm and t years).
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The introduction of the tenure variable (Tift) reﬂects the fact that soft skills are, by
deﬁnition, not easily veriﬁable. The ﬁrm (and the worker) have to learn about them.
As emphasized in the theory section, this lack of easy veriﬁcation places workers with
high soft skills in innovative ﬁrms in a stronger bargaining position. This is precisely
what the term φj(Rft, Tift, ψi) is designed to capture.
We include two dimensions of unobserved worker heterogeneity – namely γi and
ψi. We are interested in capturing the impact of (diﬃcult to observed) soft skills (ψi)
on wages. There are potentially confounding factors, for example people with high
soft skills might also have other skills that are unobserved by the econometrician but
observed by the ﬁrm. In principle γi would capture these. The diﬃculty is that γi
reﬂects the average of the unobserved component in soft skills that is revealed while
the worker is in an innovative ﬁrm during the sample period. This could lead us to
underestimate the impact of soft skills. Instead we would like to condition on the
level of skills of the worker at entry into our sample, rather than on the average over
the whole sample. To do this our preferred speciﬁcation is one in which we replace
γi by a measure of the initial wage. Conveniently our data does contain pre-sample
observations on wages, and we use an average of these observations on the wage for
each individual. This pre-sample mean will reﬂect the worker’s initial skill level and is
not inﬂuenced by the evolution of the soft skills term during the observation period.13
Table 5 shows the estimates of the parameters in equation (4.3). For simplicity,
when computing φj, we measure R&D by a binary variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is
innovative and use a categorical variable for λ (using our three groups in Table 4).
The columns relate to diﬀerent samples based on tenure of the worker in the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst column includes workers with tenure up to 5 years, the second column up
to 8 years, the third up to 10 years and the fourth column up to 15 years. The
three way interaction term, R&D ﬁrm ×Tenure ×high-lambda, shows that there
is a wage premium to working in a more innovative ﬁrm for workers in low-skilled
occupations, when these occupations have high lambda (suggesting it is driven by
complementarity). This is increasing in tenure, and the more so in the earlier years
(Fact 3 of the model). This in turn reﬂects the fact that soft skills take time to be
revealed to the ﬁrm. The eﬀect of φj is less precise when we include workers with
tenure up to 10 years and disappears as we move to worker up to a 15 year tenure.
13This is similar to an idea developed in Blundell et al. (1999) and Blundell et al. (2002).
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Table 5: R&D and hourly wages low-skilled occupations
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tenure: < 5 years < 8 years < 10 years < 15 years
R&D ﬁrm 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.042***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
×Med-lambda 0.048*** 0.041** 0.045*** 0.046***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
×High-lambda 0.046* 0.048* 0.056** 0.067***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
× Tenure 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
×Tenure ×Med-lambda -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
×Tenure ×High-lambda 0.010* 0.008** 0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Med-lambda 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
High-lambda 0.098*** 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Tenure 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
× Med-lambda 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
× High-lambda 0.001 0.003* 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure Squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.069***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Full-time 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.106***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Initial Wage 0.224*** 0.248*** 0.259*** 0.282***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Fixed Effects
Geo-Year X X X X
R2 0.325 0.351 0.365 0.392
Observations 220,214 275,751 300,202 336,596
Notes: The dependent variable, log of hourly wage, is deﬁned in Appendix A.2.2. The main regressor,
R&D ﬁrm, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is reporting any positive expenditures in R&D. Other
covariates deﬁnitions are given in Table A7. Ordinary Least Square regression on the sample of workers in
low-skilled occupations including travel to work area times year ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroskedasticity robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are computed to indicate the level of signiﬁcance: ***, ** and * for
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of signiﬁcance.
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5 Additional Results
5.1 Tenure of workers in low-skilled occupations in more in-
novative firms
Our model predicts that workers in low-skilled occupations should have longer tenure
in more innovative ﬁrms, as more time and money is required to get them to the
position where they can achieve their full potential. This is indeed what we see from
Figure 7 (Prediction 4 of the model).
Figure 7: Tenure, by occupation and R&D intensity
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Notes: Vertical axis shows the average of the number of years spent in the ﬁrm. R&D inten-
sity if plotted by dividing ﬁrm into 20 percentiles of the R&D intensity distribution, with one cate-
gory for non innovative ﬁrms; the number shown on the horizontal axis is the mean R&D intensity in
that percentile. The bottom curve shows mean tenure for workers in low-skilled occupations and the
top line for workers in high-skilled occupations (see section A.2.3). 95% conﬁdent intervals are included
As suggested by the theory, a ﬁrm may use on the job training to help reveal, and
even develop, soft skills. This is something that we also conﬁrm below.
5.2 Training of workers in low-skilled occupations is higher in
more R&D intensive firms
We look for evidence in support of the prediction (Fact 4) that more innovative ﬁrms
invest more in training their workers in low-skilled occupations. Unfortunately, we do
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Table 6: On the job and on-site training for workers in
low skilled occupations
Tercile of R&D intensity
None Low Middle High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
On-site or in-plant
None 20.3 20.0 18.1 18.4
Up to 6 months 65.8 64.2 59.0 54.8
6 months - 1 year 7.6 8.3 11.5 12.8
A year or more 6.3 7.5 11.4 14.0
On-the-job
None 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.1
Up to 6 months 74.8 72.9 64.5 60.3
6 months - 1 year 7.8 8.8 13.3 14.8
A year or more 7.1 8.4 12.7 15.9
Notes: R&D ﬁrms are split in three groups of equal size based on the value
of their R&D expenditures per employee. Data are taken from O*NET and
report the share of workers in low-skilled occupations reporting having been
trained for diﬀerent durations whether on-site or on-the job.
not have direct information on the spending on training by UK ﬁrms, and we do not
know if a worker has actually received training. We thus return to the occupation level
data in O*NET, exploiting two additional questions about the duration of training
on-site or on-the-job. Table 6 reports the share of workers that are in occupations
associated with diﬀerent levels of training (in the US): none, up to 6 months, between
6 months and a year and more than a year. What Table 6 shows in columns 1 to 4
is that in the most R&D intensive ﬁrms, from 14% to 15.9% of workers in low-skilled
occupations report having received training for more than one year, whereas only
6.3% to 7.1% of workers in low-skilled occupations report having received training for
more than one year in no-R&D ﬁrms.
5.3 Outsourcing
Our model predicts (Fact 5) that more innovative ﬁrms tend to outsource a higher
fraction of tasks than less innovative ﬁrms, in particular those tasks with lower com-
plementarity (associated with a smaller λ in the model). The previous results using
O*NET data have already shown that innovative ﬁrms put more weight on low-skilled
occupations that are associated with longer training and larger consequences in case
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of error. Unfortunately, it is not easy to directly measure outsourcing in our data for
at least two reasons. First, because outsourced workers do not necessary appear in
the ASHE data, and even if they do, they won’t be linked to the ﬁrm that use their
services. Second, because we conjecture that most of the outsourcing occurred before
2004, which prevents us from following workers in low-skilled occupations that are
outsourced from innovative ﬁrms as in Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017).
We therefore proceed indirectly. We start from the assumption that, because the
technology of cleaning does not vary much across ﬁrms, all ﬁrms need the same share
of cleaners, which can be arguably seen as a low λ task. The only reason that the share
of cleaners amongst low-skilled workers would be lower than average in some ﬁrms
is because those ﬁrms outsource cleaning. In Figure 8, we plot the share of cleaners
among all workers in low-skilled occupations against R&D intensity in the left-hand
side panel and against total employment in the right-hand side panel. Figure 8(a)
clearly shows that innovative ﬁrms employ fewer cleaners than non innovative ﬁrms.
Our interpretation is that innovative ﬁrms are outsourcing them, and Figure 8(b)
suggests that this is not a ﬁrm size eﬀect.
Figure 8: Share of workers in low-skilled occupations that are cleaners
(a) by R&D
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Notes: The y-axis shows the share of cleaners over the total number of workers in low-skilled oc-
cupations. R&D intensity if plotted by dividing ﬁrm into 20 percentiles of the R&D intensity dis-
tribution, with one category for non innovative ﬁrms; the number shown on the horizontal axis
is the mean R&D intensity in that percentile (left-hand side panel) and the average value of em-
ployment for each quantile of employment of the ﬁrm with 20 quantiles (right-hand side panel).
5.4 Firm size
Our empirical results estimate a negative elasticity of wage with respect to the size of
the ﬁrm. However, the fact that larger ﬁrms pay higher wages is a well established fact
in the labor literature (see for example Oi and Idson, 1999). This negative eﬀect stems
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from the fact that we are focusing on large ﬁrms while the premium from working in
a ﬁrm with more employees is essentially captured by relatively small ﬁrms as shown
in Figure 9.14
Figure 9: Wages by ﬁrm size
(a) All ﬁrms in ASHE
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(b) Only ﬁrms with more than 400 employees
2
2.5
3
3.5
Lo
g o
f h
ou
rly
 wa
ge
0 5 10 15 20
Quantile of employment
Low Skill Intermediate Skill High Skill
Notes: Vertical axis shows the average of the logarithm of hourly wage by ﬁrm. Horizon-
tal axis shows the average value of employment for each quantile of employment of the ﬁrm,
with 20 quantiles. The left-hand side panel considers all ﬁrms that are in ASHE whereas the
right-hand side panel only considers ﬁrms over 400 employees and corresponds to our ﬁnal sample.
5.5 Robustness
In this subsection we show that our main results are robust to a number of potential
concerns. In particular, we show that the positive correlation between the wage of
workers in low-skilled occupations and R&D intensity is robust to including diﬀerent
sets of ﬁxed eﬀects, namely to including ﬁrm eﬀects, as in Abowd et al. (1999). We
also show that our results are not sensitive to the way we measure wages and to
considering alternative functions of R&D, both of which yield qualitatively similar
results.
5.5.1 Initial wage and binary measure of R&D
As a ﬁrst robustness test, we show in Appendix B how the results in Table 2 are
aﬀected when we control for initial wage and/or use a binary measure of R&D (Tables
B1, B2 and B3) for consistency with what is done in Table 5. Although the diﬀerence
between workers in low and intermediate-skilled occupations tend to thin down, the
14In results not reported here from estimating the eﬀect of R&D on wage using the whole ASHE
sample (that is, without restricting attention to large ﬁrms), we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of the logarithm of total employment on wage.
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diﬀerence in the return to R&D between workers in low and high-skilled occupations
remains signiﬁcant.
5.5.2 R&D, firm effect and other fixed effects
Here we show robustness of our results when diﬀerent sets of ﬁxed eﬀects are used.
From Table 2 we investigate in particular the use of additive two-way ﬁrm and worker
ﬁxed eﬀects. As discussed in Section 4.3, we cannot use individual ﬁxed eﬀect in the
model presented in Table 5, we nevertheless consider robustness tests when occupation
ﬁxed or ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are included to the model.
Occupation effects: Our results shown in Column 7 of Table 2 control for indi-
vidual ﬁxed eﬀects. In Table B4 in Appendix B, we change the set of ﬁxed eﬀects.
Column 1 drops the individual eﬀect and includes travel to work area - year ﬁxed
eﬀects and column 2 includes travel to work area - occupation - year ﬁxed eﬀects.
In both case, we include the log of the initial wage as a control to capture worker’s
initial skill level. Column 3 reproduces our main results using individual ﬁxed eﬀect
for comparison. Similarly, in column 2 of Table B5 in Appendix B we show that when
occupation ﬁxed eﬀects are added to Table 5 the marginal eﬀect of R&D intensity
interacted with tenure for workers in low-skilled occupations in high lambda occupa-
tions remains signiﬁcant (this even holds for workers up to a tenure of 10 years).
Firm effects: In our analysis so far we have not controlled for potential unobserv-
able ﬁrm factors. In columns 4 and 5 of Table B4 we include ﬁrm eﬀects. R&D
remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the workers in low-skill occupations.
Here, identiﬁcation comes oﬀ changes in wages in ﬁrms that increase or decrease their
R&D intensity. The full impact of R&D here is the coeﬃcient on R&D plus the eﬀect
of R&D on the ﬁrm eﬀect. We obtain an estimate of this from an auxiliary regres-
sion. We recover the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect from the estimates in column (5) and regress
this on mean R&D intensity. The estimated coeﬃcient is 0.0174 with standard error
of 0.0011 from a regression on 6,071 observations.
We recover the ﬁrm and individual ﬁxed eﬀects using the estimates in column (3)
of Table B4. Figure 10 shows that they are positively correlated for workers in low-
skilled occupations. Each dot in the graph is the mean eﬀect in the relevant centiles
(we split ﬁrms into 100 bins of equal size, with around 66 observations per bin) and
take the average of worker ﬁxed eﬀects within each bin.
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Figure 10: Correlation between ﬁrm and individual eﬀects, by skill
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Notes: The x-axis shows the average ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect in each centile. The y-axis shows the av-
erage individual ﬁxed eﬀect in each centile. Centiles are 100 equal sized bins by ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect.
These estimates suﬀer from a potential incidental parameter bias. We use the
panel jackknife split sample procedure suggested in Dhaene and Jochmans (2015).
This involves estimates of the model parameters based on splitting the sample into
two non-overlapping random sub-samples. Each sub-sample contains one half of the
choice occasions for each individual. Denote the estimate for the full sample β̂ and the
estimate for the two subsamples β̂(1,T/2) and β̂(T/2,T ). The jackknife (bias corrected)
estimator is:
β˜split = 2β̂ −
β̂(1,T/2) + β̂(T/2,T )
2
.
We compute the bias-corrected coeﬃcients on R&D ﬁrm interacted with skill level
of the occupation and on the ﬁrm eﬀects. We take the average values over 50 draws.
The corrected coeﬃcient on R&D ﬁrm interacted with low-skill occupation is 0.0038,
compared with the uncorrected estimate of 0.0037. Figures 11(a), 11(b) and 11(c)
plots the density of the split sample corrected coeﬃcient over the 50 draws for workers
in low, intermediate and high-skilled occupations respecitvely. The solid line shows
the mean of these corrected estimates, the dashed line shows the uncorrected estimate.
Finally, column 3 of Table B5 includes ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to the model presented
in Table 5 and shows that the main result remains signiﬁcant, namely that the in-
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Figure 11: Firm ﬁxed eﬀect with and without Jacknife correction
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the distribution of the coeﬃcient on R&D intensity interacted with the low-skill
occupation dummies across our 50 draws. The vertical lines represents the average value of the distribu-
tion (solid line) and the uncorrected point estimate from column (5) of Table B4 (dashed line). Panels (b)
and (c) do the same but for the interaction with the intermediate skill and high skill dummies respectively.
teraction between the R&D dummy and tenure is positive for workers in low-skilled
occupations in high lambda occupations.
5.5.3 Bonus income and other measures of income
We might be concerned with the fact that workers in high-skill occupations might
receive a substantial part of their wage in the form of lump-sum bonuses at the end
of the year, and that these bonuses might not be well captured by measures of weekly
wages. This would particularly be an issue if workers in high-skilled occupations
receive larger bonuses in more R&D intensive ﬁrms.
More generally, how are our results aﬀected by the deﬁnition of income that we
use? In our baseline results we used wages measured in the week that the survey is
collected. As explained in Appendix A.2.2, this includes a ﬁxed salary plus variable
earnings from incentive, overtime and other pay. Here we test the sensitivity of
the correlation between R&D intensity and wage to using other measures of income.
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Results are presented in Table B6 in Appendix B where the usual set of control
variables are included and individual and year ﬁxed eﬀects are added. Column 1 uses
the baseline measure (logarithm of total earning per hours) as a reference. Column 2
uses the same measure but restricting to ﬁxed salary and excluding overtime. Column
3 and 4 use total annual earnings including (resp. excluding) bonuses. If workers in
high-skilled occupations receive most of their earnings from incentive paid at the end
of the year and hence not well captured by our baseline measure of wages (based on
a standard week in April). This could potentially drive our results if workers in high-
skilled occupations receive a larger share of their earnings as bonuses in innovative
ﬁrms. In fact, the average share of bonuses in annual earnings is 8.8% for R&D ﬁrms
against 6.5% for non R&D ﬁrms. Finally, comparing columns 3 and 4 of Table B6
shows no substantial diﬀerences when bonus are included or excluded.
Similarly in Columns 4 and 5 of Table B5, we show that our main results from
Table 5 are unaﬀected when the dependent variable is replaced by the logarithm of
total ﬁxed pay per hours (i.e. when incentive and overtime pays are excluded) and
the logarithm of total gross annual revenue respectively.
5.5.4 Alternative functions of R&D
Here, we show that our results from Table 2 hold using alternative functions of R&D.
Our baseline results use the logarithm of total R&D expenditure divided by total
employment in the ﬁrm. Figure 3 shows that the relationship between the log of
hourly wage and this function of R&D seems to be close to linear. In this subsection
we show that our results hold when we consider diﬀerent functional forms of R&D that
give diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent level of R&D intensity. In Table B7 we successively
consider: log(1 + R&D
L
), log(1 + R&D), R&D
L
and H
(
x
l
)
where H is the hyperbolic
function: H(x) = log(x +
√
1 + x2). In each case, our focus is on the interaction
coeﬃcient between this function of R&D and the low-skill occupation dummy.
To allow for even more ﬂexibility we let the coeﬃcient vary across the R&D
distribution by including a binary variable for each of the twenty quantiles of R&D:
ln(wijkft) = x
′
iftβ1 + z
′
ftβ2 +
20∑
l=1
β3lRftl + νi + νt + ǫit, (5)
where Rftl is equal to 1 if ﬁrm f belongs to quantile l in year t. The estimated
coeﬃcients β3l on each of these binary variables are presented graphically in Figure
12, where the reference is the group of ﬁrms with no R&D. We see that the coeﬃcients
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Figure 12: 20 quantiles of R&D based on level of total R&D expenditures
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(b) Workers in low-skill occupations
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(c) Workers in intermediate-skill occupations
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(d) Workers in high-skill occupations
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Notes: These Figures reports coeﬃcients on each of the 20 quantiles of total R&D expendi-
tures when estimating equation 5 (β3l). The usual set of control variables are included as well
as a set of travel to work area times year ﬁxed eﬀects. Conﬁdence interval at 95% are re-
ported and are computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level.
are positive and increase with the quantile of R&D for low skill occupations (Figure
12(b)), are positive and signiﬁcant for the highest quantiles in the case of intermediate-
skill occupations (Figure 12(c)) and are never signiﬁcant in the case of high-skill
occupations (Figure 12(d)). Figure 12(a) shows that overall, innovation is associated
with higher wages for most quantiles.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use matched employee-employer administrative data from the UK,
augmented with information on R&D expenditures, to analyze the relationship be-
tween wages and innovation. We show that more R&D intensive ﬁrms pay higher
wages on average, and in particular workers in some low-skilled occupations beneﬁt
considerably from working in more R&D intensive ﬁrms.
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We develop a simple model of the ﬁrm which generates this ﬁnding, one where
the complementarity between soft skills of workers in low-skilled occupations with the
other ﬁrm’s assets increases with the ﬁrm’s degree of innovativeness. Soft skills are an
important determinant of the wages of workers in low-skilled occupations – they are
a key driver of the complementarity between low-skilled and high-skilled workers –
yet they are diﬃcult to observe and verify (both by the ﬁrm and the econometrician).
Our model generates a number of additional predictions that we can take to
the data. A key additional prediction from the model is that returns to tenure
are higher for workers in low-skilled occupations in innovative ﬁrms compared with
non-innovative ﬁrms. We ﬁnd empirical support for this when we include the triple
interaction between tenure, R&D intensity and a measure of the degree complemen-
tarity between workers in low-skilled occupations and the other assets of the ﬁrm.
The model also predicts that workers in low-skilled occupations have longer tenure in
more innovative ﬁrms than in less innovative ﬁrms, which we show is true in our data
and that more eﬀort is spent on their training, which is consistent with evidence from
O*NET data. A ﬁnal prediction is that more innovative ﬁrms outsource a higher frac-
tion of tasks where there is low complementarity between the workers in low-skilled
and high-skilled occupations. Although we do not have great data on outsourcing, we
show that evidence from one industry, the cleaning industry, is consistent with this.
While we do not rule out other possible models or explanations for workers in
some low-skilled occupations earning higher returns in more innovative ﬁrms, we
argue that our model is an appealing way to explain these ﬁndings, and is consistent
with a number of other empirical facts.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. It would be interesting to look
at whether, as our model predicts, the (low-skilled) occupations that yield more return
to innovativeness (i.e. for which wage increases more with innovativeness) are more
“relational”. A second idea is to further explore whether more innovative ﬁrms provide
more training to workers in low-skilled occupations. Third, our model predicts that
our main eﬀect (namely that workers in low-skilled occupations beneﬁt more from
working in a more innovative ﬁrm) is stronger in more competitive sectors or in areas
where potential replacements for incumbent workers in low-skilled occupations are of
lower quality. Fourth, we used R&D investment as our measure of innovativeness,
and it would be interesting to look at other measures, such as patenting.
Finally, in this work we used data on a 1% sample of employees. It is likely
that workers at diﬀerent parts of the earning distribution and company hierarchy are
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diﬀerentially aﬀected. We could then look at subgroups of agents within the high-
and low-skilled occupation categories. In particular, we would expect the premium to
working in a more innovative ﬁrm to be higher at the very top end of the occupation
distribution. A ﬁrst place to look is at CEOs, taking into account their total revenues
(wage income plus capital income). These and other extensions of the analysis in this
paper await further research.
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ONLINE APPENDICES
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
A Data construction and additional description
This appendix describes the construction of our main sample which results from the
merge of two datasets provided by the ONS: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) and the Business Expenditures on Research and Development (BERD).
A.1 Business Expenditures on Research and Development
The Business Expenditures on Research and Development (BERD, Oﬃce for National
Statistics, 2016b) is an annual survey conducted by the Oﬃce of National Statistics
(ONS) that collects information on R&D activities of businesses in the United King-
dom. It is a stratiﬁed random sample from the population of ﬁrms that conduct R&D.
The selected ﬁrms then receive a form asking them to detail their innovative activities
in accordance to the OECD’s Frascati Manual guidelines. The stratiﬁcation scheme
has changed over time, but includes a census of ﬁrms with over 400 employees. These
are the ﬁrms we are interested in. The BERD data is available from 1994-2014 with
a coverage that is consistent since 2000.
BERD records expenditures at the level of the ﬁrm, the product that the R&D
is related to, and the establishment carrying out the R&D. We also know whether
R&D was carried out in house (intramural) or outsourced (extramural). Product is
recorded at the level of 33 categories. We know the split between civil and defense.
More than 99% of the sampled ﬁrms report R&D for only one product, representing
75% of total intramural expenditures and 69% of extramural expenditures. 88.2% of
intramural R&D expenditures and 96.5% of extramural R&D is civilian; 10% of ﬁrms
that report doing some R&D do at least some defense R&D. Total R&D expenditures
are the sum of intramural and extramural R&D at the ﬁrm level. In the paper, we
refer to the level of R&D “R&D expenditures” and the level of R&D divided by the
number of employees in the ﬁrm as “R&D intensity”. Including extramural R&D is
important as many large ﬁrms outsource a large part of their R&D activities, see
Figure A1, and this varies across industries.
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Figure A1: Share of total R&D expenditures that is outsourced (extramural) against
R&D intensity
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Notes: Source: BERD. R&D intensity is deﬁned as the logarithm of total R&D expenditures divided
by employment. Dashed lines correspond to the upper and lower bound of a 95% conﬁdent interval.
Table A1 reports the average amount of intramural and extramural R&D across 20
quantiles of the distribution of total R&D intensity.15 The distributions of both intra
and extramural R&D are highly skewed, in particular, ﬁrms in the highest vintile are
very diﬀerent from others.
15Quantiles of R&D are computed each year, so ﬁrms can move across quantiles.
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Table A1: Distribution of employment and R&D
Quantile of R&D Employment Intramural R&D Extramural R&D Total R&D R&D intensity Number of ﬁrm-years
0 (no R&D) 2,347 0 0 0 0 29,848
1 8,448 83 5 88 2.63 434
2 4,663 245 13 258 4.04 427
3 3,437 361 23 384 4.67 426
4 2,929 428 65 493 5.11 429
5 2,903 672 80 752 5.50 427
6 1,678 542 52 594 5.85 427
7 1,925 824 66 890 6.14 427
8 1,740 1,041 81 1,122 6.44 427
9 1,339 1,013 121 1,134 6.73 427
10 1,592 1,528 192 1,720 6.99 426
11 1,752 2,179 319 2,498 7.25 431
12 1,951 3,165 592 3,757 7.51 427
13 1,597 3,469 407 3,876 7.78 427
14 1,467 4,453 412 4,865 8.08 428
15 1,618 6,813 462 7,275 8.41 424
16 2,609 16,900 819 17,719 8.78 429
17 2,535 23,600 1,333 24,933 9.19 429
18 2,255 34,200 2,742 36,942 9.72 426
19 2,484 64,400 10,300 74,700 10.30 427
20 2,284 143,000 91,700 234,700 11.31 422
Notes: This table presents the average number of employees, average expenditures in intramural R&D (in thousand pounds), average expenditures
in extramural R&D (in thousand pounds), the sum of the two and average R&D intensity (deﬁned as the sum of intramural and extramural R&D
expenditures per employee) for 20 quantiles of R&D intensity. The ﬁrst categories “0 (no R&D)” corresponds to ﬁrm that do not report R&D in the
current year. Quantiles of R&D are computed each year on the sample of ﬁrms that have been matched to ASHE and that contains more than 400
employees (see subsection A.4).
Our measure of R&D intensity is the logarithm of total R&D expenditures (in-
cluding both intramural and extramural R&D) divided by the number of employee in
the ﬁrm. R&D expenditure, as well as total employment, are deﬁned at the ﬁrm level.
In practice, we use ln(1+Rft), where Rft is the ratio of total R&D expenditures over
total employment, to accommodate values of 0 in ﬁrms that do not do any R&D; it is
almost always equal to ln(Rft) given the magnitude of R&D expenditure, so we can
interpret β3 as the elasticity of wage with respect to R&D intensity.
A.2 Annual Survey on Hours and Earnings (ASHE)
The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE, Oﬃce for National Statistics,
2016a) is a 1% random sample of the UK workforce based on the last two digits
of the national insurance numbers. We use data from 2004 to 2015.16 The level of
observation in ASHE is the individual job, however, over 98% of individuals have only
one job at any point in time, so appear only once per year in the dataset. We have a
total of over 1,850,000 observations on around 340,000 individuals working in around
158,000 enterprises.17
16There is a discontinuity in ASHE in 2004.
17An enterprise can be a private corporation, public company, government agency, non proﬁt
organisation, etc.
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A.2.1 Cleaning
We clean the data and remove observations: with a missing individual identiﬁer (vari-
able piden), with a missing ﬁrm identiﬁer (variable entref) or those not coded with
an adult rate marker (variable adr), which mostly involves removing trainees from
the sample. We keep only the main job for each individual. This cleaning removes
4.2% of observations. The version of ASHE we use is a panel where individuals are
uniquely identiﬁed by their (transformed) national insurance number. However, a
problem occurs with temporary national insurance number that are reused for diﬀer-
ent people. We drop all individuals that change gender or change birth dates: 1.2%
of observations are aﬀected and dropped. We delete individuals where the data are
clearly miscoded, e.g. their age that is less than their tenure in the ﬁrm, and we
drop individuals aged less than 18 or older than 64 (around 2% of total observations).
The outcome of this cleaning is a database of more than 1,650,000 observations on
around 320,000 individuals working in 140,000 enterprises. We call this database
“Clean ASHE”.
A.2.2 Wages
There are various measures of wages in ASHE. Gross weekly wage is collected during
the survey period (from one to four weeks) in April of each year. This is reported by
the employer and is considered to be very accurate. The gross weekly wage can be
broken down into basic pay, incentive pay, overtime pay, additional premium payment
for shifts that are not considered overtime and additional pay for other reasons. The
gross weekly wage does not include any capital income such as stock-options (reported
“incentive pay” includes proﬁt sharing, productivity, performance and other bonus or
incentive pay, piecework and commission.). The number of hours worked are reported,
split between overtime and basic paid hours. ASHE also provides data on gross annual
earnings, as well as the share of this earning that is an incentive payment.
We deﬁne hourly wages as the ratio of gross weekly wage divided by total number
of paid hours (including overtimes). This is the measure of wage we will consider as
a baseline but we also show descriptive statistics for gross annual earnings. Including
other types of earnings and incentive payments is arguably relevant especially in the
case of high income individuals as shown by Bell and Van Reenen (2013, 2014). We
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study the sensitivity of our results to including or excluding additional types of income
in the basic pay in section 5.5.3.18
A.2.3 Skills classification
We use a classiﬁcation based on a match between the National Qualiﬁcation Frame-
work (NQF) and the Standard Occupation Code (SOC).19 The NQF deﬁnes 8 levels
of skill based on the required qualiﬁcation from PhD (level 8) to Entry level (less
than GCSE grade D-G). The current UK immigration rules use 6 groups (see Table
A2).20
Note that there is another possible classiﬁcation of skills, based on the standard
occupational classiﬁcation (SOC). Skills here are deﬁned as “the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of the tasks as-
sociated with a job”. Level 4 corresponds to the highest skill level and includes Corpo-
rate Managers, Science and technology professionals, Health professionals, Teaching
and research professionals and Business and public service professionals. Level 1 cor-
responds to the lowest skill level and includes elementary trade, plant and storage
related occupations and elementary administration and service occupations.
This classiﬁcation relies on the ﬁrst two digits of the 4-digit SOC code. Its main
advantage is that it is very straightforward to implement and it is consistent in time.
Indeed, although the SOC changed its classiﬁcation in 2000 and 2010, the ﬁrst two
digits remain unchanged. However, one disadvantage is that relying on the ﬁrst two
digit is not accurate enough to distinguish between, for example, a restaurant man-
ager (SOC2010 code 1223) and a natural environment and conservation manager
(SOC2010 code 1212). But according to the work of Elias and Purcell (2004), the
former group counts 9.5% of people aged 21-35 and holding a ﬁrst degree or higher
whereas the latter counts 72% of them. This analysis is based on the labor Force
Survey 2001-2003. In another article, Elias and Purcell (2013), they advocate the
use of another classiﬁcation and consider the restaurant manager group as a “non
graduate group” and the natural environment manager as an “expert group”.
Tables A3 and A4 show that these workers have diﬀerent labor market participa-
tion behaviours and diﬀerent outcomes in the labor market.
18The share of incentive pay increases strongly with earnings, while the share of overtime pay is
stable around 5% for the ﬁrst three quarters of the wage distribution, and decreases with wage for
the remaining top quarter.
19See for example the “code of practice for skilled work, Immigration Rule Appendix J”.
20A few speciﬁc occupations, which we don’t use in our analysis, are unclassiﬁed: clergy, military,
elected oﬃcers, sports players and coaches and prison service oﬃcers.
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Table A2: Skill classiﬁcation
Skill category Description
Low-skill
Skill cat 1 Lowest skill occupations, includes many manufacturing basic
occupations, child-care related education, housekeeping, tele-
phone salespersons
Skill cat 2 corresponds to a NQF below 3 but not considered as an entry
level. Occupations such as pharmaceutical dispensers, green-
keepers, aircraft maintenance technicians
Intermediate-skill
Skill cat 3 Requires a NQF of 3 which corresponds to a Level of Ad-
vanced GCE (A-level). This category spans many diﬀerent
occupations from Fitness instructors to Legal associate pro-
fessionals.
Skill cat 4 Requires a NQF of 4 and above which corresponds to a Cer-
tiﬁcate of Higher Education. It includes many technical occu-
pations like Medical technicians or IT operations technicians
and some managerial occupations.
High-skill
Skill cat 5 Includes most managerial and executive occupations as well
as engineers. These occupations require at least a NQF of
6 which corresponds to a Bachelor’s degree or a Graduate
Certiﬁcate.
Skill cat 6 Corresponds to occupational skilled to PhD-level and include
most scientiﬁc occupations like Chemical scientists, Biological
scientists, Research and development manager but also Higher
education teaching professionals.
Notes: This table describe the education requirement for each of our six skill categories. These
requirements have been taken from the “code of practice for skilled work, Immigration Rule
Appendix J”.
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Table A3: Demographics by skill level
Obs. Hours % Work
Full-Time
% Male Age Tenure
Low-skill 443,002 30.9 62 51 37.6 6.5
Intermediate-skill 113,297 36.3 90 60 39.3 9.4
High-skill 124,420 36.5 95 69 40.8 9.9
Notes: Skill categories are based on occupation codes as described in A.2.3.
Table A4: Pay by skill categories
Skill Hourly
pay
Weekly
pay
%
incentive
%
overtime
Annual
earnings
Low-skill
Skill cat 1 8.64 286 2.54 5.64 13,612
Skill cat 2 11.59 446 2.25 5.32 21,970
Intermediate-skill
Skill cat 3 13.59 507 5.21 3.56 25,936
Skill cat 4 16.83 625 5.21 2.13 32,820
High-skill
Skill cat 5 25.62 938 7.64 1.42 54,075
Skill cat 6 22.39 810 6.33 1.11 43,868
Notes: Skill categories are based on occupation codes as explained in subsection A.2.3.
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A.3 Travel to work areas
A labor market is deﬁned as a travel to work area and there are around 240 such
areas in the UK depending on the year.21 Since 2011, there are exactly 228 travel to
work areas (TTWAs) in the UK with 149 in England, 45 in Scotland, 18 in Wales,
10 in Northern Ireland and 6 cross-border. This is a tool widely used by geographers
and statisticians although they have no legal status. They are deﬁned as a form of
Metropolitan Area and intent to group urban areas and their commuters hinterland.
London, Bristol and Manchester are examples of Travel To Work Areas.
A.4 Matching BERD and ASHE
We match the individuals in “Clean ASHE” with the ﬁrms they work for in BERD;
we restrict attention to private corporations (dropping public corporations, charities,
unincorporated ﬁrms, etc). We start with all individuals in “Clean ASHE” who work
for a ﬁrm with 400 or more employees and match them to the population of ﬁrms
in BERD with 400 or more employees. Our ﬁnal sample includes around 580,000
observations on around 150,000 individuals working in around 6,300 diﬀerent ﬁrms;
there are around 31,000 ﬁrm-year combinations. The implication of the matching and
exact numbers can be found in Table A5 and the outcome of merging the subsample
of ﬁrms in BERD over 400 employees and private ﬁrms in ASHE over 400 employees
is presented in Table A6.
We use information on ﬁrms with more than 400 employees. These ﬁrms diﬀer
from smaller ones in some ways that are shown in Table A5. However, the distribution
of wage in this sample is very similar to the one in the total sample, as seen in Figure
A2. The geographical coverage of these ﬁrms is also very similar.
21Deﬁnitions of travel to work areas change in time. For this reason, we never use a travel to
work area continuously in time.
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Table A5: Construction of the sample
ASHE Observations Individuals Mean wage Sd wage
Raw ASHE 2,680,485 394,012 12.7 36.5
Clean ASHE 1,988,984 348,996 13.5 14.7
Private Corporations 1,180,002 254,739 13 17
Final Sample 681,253 165,112 13 18.3
BERD Observations Firms % intramural R&D % extramural R&D
Raw BERD 279,257 57,439 100 100
400+ Employees 9,978 2,032 75 85
Final Sample 9,433 1,995 66 81
Notes: This table presents the evolution of the two databases ASHE and BERD across the successive steps
conducted to match them. ASHE: Raw data corresponds to the standard ASHE database 2004-2015. Clean
ASHE corresponds to the database “Cleaned ASHE” as described in subsection A.2.1. Private corporation
corresponds to “Clean ASHE” restricted to private corporations and Final corresponds to “Clean ASHE” restricted
to private corporations with more than 400 employees. Mean wage is measured as the average total weekly earning.
BERD: Raw data corresponds to the standard BERD database 2004-2015. 400+ employees corresponds to this
database restricted to ﬁrm with more than 400 employees and Final corresponds to ﬁrms of more than 400
employees that matched the ﬁnal version of ASHE. % of intramural and extramural R&D are measured with
respect to Raw data.
Table A6: Matching results at the ﬁrm-year level
Year in BERD not in ASHE in ASHE not in BERD in BERD and ASHE
2004 101 2,378 671
2005 91 2,352 808
2006 92 2,314 955
2007 102 2,343 757
2008 96 2,390 628
2009 73 2,347 800
2010 85 2,304 697
2011 95 2,351 710
2012 97 2,410 782
2013 109 2,449 800
2014 109 2,567 845
2015 123 2,663 892
2016 156 2,605 899
Notes: This table presents the number of ﬁrms that did not match because they
are in BERD but not in ASHE (column 1) or because they are in ASHE but not
in BERD (column 2) and the ﬁrms that are both in BERD and ASHE (column 3).
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Table A7: Variable description
Variable name Description
Age Age of the individual at the time of the survey in year
Tenure Number of years spent in the ﬁrm by the individual
Male Dummy for being a male
Full Time Dummy for working more than 25 hours a week on average
Age2 Age squared
Tenure2 Tenure squared
Notes: This table presents the description of the main variables used in the regressions.
Figure A2: Cumulative distribution function of log wage
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the empirical cumulative distribution function for two samples: Clean
ASHE, corresponding to the 1% random sample of the British population without restriction (other
than some cleaning described in Appendix A.2 and Final Sample corresponding to workers of private
companies with more than 400 employees.
A.5 Descriptive statistics
Table A7 gives description of the variables used in the regressions throughout the
paper while A8 shows statistical moments of the main variables of interest at the
individual level. Low-skill workers represent the majority of workers in our sample
(59%)22, see Table A3. Workers with higher skill level earn higher wages with the
exception of skill category 6 (researchers and professors), where the average is below
the average for category 5. We also see from Table A4 that more innovative ﬁrms
have on average a larger proportion of workers in high-skilled occupations.
22This is a slightly larger proportion than when considering the share of low skilled worker in the
whole “clean ASHE” dataset (48%).
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Table A8: Descriptive statistics of wage variables
Variable Mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99
Hourly Wage (£) 14.3 13.5 6.6 7.7 10.4 16.3 25.7 61.4
Weekly Wage (£) 508 480 126 238 394 637 973 2214
Weekly Incentive Pay (£) 8.5 85.5 0 0 0 0 0 184.3
Weekly Overtime Pay (£) 20.2 61.3 0 0 0 3.6 63.2 294
Annual Wage (£) 26,438 43,919 4,673 9,966 19,288 32,396 50,169 136,841
Basic Paid Hours 36.1 11.6 17.6 31.7 40.6 42.9 44.5 58
Paid Overtime 1.7 4.5 0 0 0 0.4 5.8 22
Age 42.3 13.6 24.2 30.8 41.8 52.8 61.6 69.3
Tenure 8.4 8.9 1.1 2.2 5.5 11 20.9 39.6
Notes: This table presents some moments (mean, standard deviation and diﬀerent percentile thresh-
olds) for a set of key variables. Tenure is the number of years an individual has been working in its
current ﬁrm.
Figure A3: Distribution of workers by skill category and R&D intensity of ﬁrm
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Figure A4 shows that the share of workers that work in a ﬁrm that does any R&D
increases from just over 20% for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, to
over 55% after the 80th percentile of the distribution where it plateaus. The share
falls right at the top, where workers in the (low innovative) ﬁnancial sector are heavily
represented. This eﬀect holds within innovative ﬁrms.
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Table A9: Share of workers at each skill category and
quantiles of R&D
Quantile Skill category Nb of Firms
of R&D Low Intermediate High
0 (no R&D) 64 18 19 32467
1 67 16 17 479
2 62 17 21 470
3 60 18 22 469
4 60 17 23 470
5 60 16 24 472
6 59 19 22 471
7 61 17 23 469
8 59 18 23 471
9 62 16 21 471
10 57 19 25 469
11 53 18 28 473
12 50 21 29 468
13 46 21 33 473
14 44 21 35 470
15 44 22 34 468
16 41 21 38 473
17 35 20 44 471
18 33 20 48 470
19 28 21 51 469
20 20 20 60 466
Notes: This table presents the average proportion of each skill
group by quantile of R&D intensity (in %). Skill groups are deﬁned
in Appendix A.2.3. Quantiles are the same as in Table A1.
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Figure A4: Share of workers in R&D ﬁrms at each quantile of the overall wage
distribution
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the share of workers from innovative ﬁrms (deﬁned as ﬁrms reporting
a positive amount of R&D expenditures since 2000) at each quantile of the overall hourly wage
distribution. All observations from our Final Sample from 2004 to 2015 are considered independently.
A.6 O*NET data
The O*NET dataset is a database aiming at providing an accurate deﬁnition of each
occupations in the US at a very detailed level. Information include the type of
tasks, the skills and abilities usually required and many characteristics such as, for
example, the level of exposition to noise. The database is freely available from the
dedicated website23 and we use the version 21.1 Database - November 2016 Release.
The information have been gathered either from interviewing workers or from experts
descriptions. Although the O*NET data is only based on US workers, we believe
that the job descriptions are very similar to those of the UK. To match the diﬀerent
occupation classiﬁcation we match O*NET data to UK data via isco08.
23http://www.onetcenter.org/database.html
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B Additional Empirical Results
Table B1: Relationship between wages and R&D ﬁrm dummy
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Skill level All All All Low Int High All
R&D ﬁrm 0.121*** 0.066*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.008 0.001 0.004
(0.020) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
× Int-skill 0.015***
-0.005
× Low-skill 0.023***
-0.006
Age 0.059*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.002)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Tenure 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.039*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.001 0.003 -0.008***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender 0.160*** 0.141***
(0.006) (0.004)
Full-Time 0.255*** 0.072*** 0.008 -0.008 -0.080*** -0.102*** 0.000
(0.015) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Int-skill dummy -0.077***
(0.005)
Low-skill dummy -0.158***
(0.007)
Geo-year X
Geo-Occupation-year X
Individual X X X X X
Year X X X X X
R2 0.370 0.621 0.885 0.768 0.847 0.880 0.888
Observations 680,583 669,899 634,542 399,690 100,989 114,953 634,542
Notes: This Table is the same as Table 2 but the R&D intensity variable has been replaced by a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm reports some R&D
expenditures in the past (R&D ﬁrm).
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Table B2: Relationship between wages and R&D intensity - control for initial wage
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Skill level All Low Int High All
R˜ft 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
× Int-skill 0.011***
(0.001)
× Low-skill 0.018***
(0.002)
Age 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.009* -0.005 -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Gender 0.052*** 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 0.069***
(0.004) (0.005) -0.007 (0.007) (0.004)
Full-Time 0.154*** 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.030** 0.094***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007)
Int-skill dummy -0.327***
(0.010)
Low-skill dummy -0.547***
(0.011)
Initiall Wage 0.592*** 0.328*** 0.479*** 0.536*** 0.429***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Geo-year X X X X X
R2 0.616 0.446 0.469 0.534 0.699
Observations 612,871 386,319 107,546 118,403 612,871
Notes: The dependent variable is log of wage which is deﬁned in Appendix A.2.2. R˜ft = ln(1+Rft) where
Rft is total R&D expenditures of ﬁrm f during year t divided by employment. Other covariates deﬁnitions
are given in Table A7. All columns include year-labor market ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroskedasticity robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01,
0.05 and 0.1 levels of signiﬁcance.
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Table B3: Relationship between wages and R&D ﬁrm dummy - control for initial
wage
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Skill level All Low Int High All
R&D ﬁrm 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.058*** -0.003 -0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
× Int-skill 0.075***
(0.013)
× Low-skill 0.075***
(0.015)
Age 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.005 -0.015***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Gender 0.054*** 0.080*** 0.058*** 0.088*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Full-Time 0.160*** 0.111*** 0.094*** 0.031** 0.101***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.012) (0.008)
Int-skill dummy -0.328***
(0.011)
Low-skill dummy -0.539***
(0.011)
Initial Wage 0.601*** 0.339*** 0.485*** 0.536*** 0.435***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Geo-year X X X X X
R2 0.612 0.435 0.467 0.534 0.695
Observations 612,871 386,319 107,546 118,403 612,871
Notes: This Table replicates Table B2 but replaces R˜ft by a binary variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm reports
any R&D expenditures in the past.
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Table B4: Robustness to alternative ﬁxed eﬀects
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
R˜ft 0.000 0.004* 0.003*** -0.006*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Int. skill 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Low-skill 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.011*** -0.004 -0.006*** -0.023*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Gender 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Full-Time 0.094*** 0.056*** -0.001 0.064*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Int-skill dummy -0.327*** -0.332*** -0.077*** -0.266*** -0.061***
(0.01) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Low-skill dummy -0.547*** -0.417*** -0.162*** -0.480*** -0.136***
(0.01) (0.013) (0.006) (0.01) (0.006)
Initial Wage 0.429*** 0.391*** 0.369***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Fixed Effects
Geo-Year X
Geo-Year-Occupation X
Individual X X
Firm X X
Year X X X X X
R2 0.699 0.726 0.888 0.742 0.896
Observations 612,871 602,056 634,542 612,505 633,899
Notes: The dependent variable is log of wage which is deﬁned in Appendix A.2.2. R˜ft = ln(1 +Rft) where Rft
is total R&D expenditures of ﬁrm f during year t divided by employment. Other covariates deﬁnitions are given
in Table A7. Column 1 replicates column 3 in Table 2 and includes year and individual eﬀects. Column 2 includes
ﬁrm and year eﬀects. Column 3 includes worker, ﬁrm and year eﬀects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the ﬁrm level (columns 1, 2 and 3) or individual levels (columns 4 and 5) are reported in parenthesis.
***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of signiﬁcance.
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Table B5: R&D and hourly wages low-skilled occupations - Robustness
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure: < 5 years < 5 years < 5 years < 5 years < 5 years < 5 years
R&D 0.044*** 0.035*** -0.008** 0.026** 0.099*** 0.010***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.031) (0.002)
×Med-lambda 0.048*** 0.005 -0.001 0.051*** 0.026 0.006***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.046) (0.002)
×High-lambda 0.046* -0.048** 0.012 0.057** 0.027 -0.008**
(0.028) (0.022) (0.008) (0.023) (0.05) (0.004)
× Tenure 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.009 0.001*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000)
×Tenure ×Med-lambda -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.001)
×Tenure ×High-lambda 0.010* 0.011** 0.004* 0.009* 0.014 0.002**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.001)
Age 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.046*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.902*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002)
× Med-lambda 0.000 -0.001** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.129*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
× High-lambda 0.003 0.005** 0.003*** 0.001 0.004 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Tenure Squared 0.001 -0.008*** 0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Med-lambda dummy 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.027*** 0.063*** 0.115*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.019) (0.008)
High-lambda dummy 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.188*** 0.098***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013)
Firm Size -0.011*** -0.003 -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.018*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.035*** 0.150*** 0.053***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Full-Time 0.109*** 0.071*** 0.047*** 0.110*** 0.817*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
Initial Wage 0.224*** 0.173*** 0.150*** 0.201*** 0.244*** 0.171***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.009) (0.01) (0.006)
Fixed Effects
Geo-Year X X X X X
Geo-Year-Occupation X
Firm X
R2 0.325 0.410 0.490 0.337 0.526 0.414
Observations 220,214 212,821 219,588 220,139 217,178 212,821
Notes: Column 1 of this Table is the same as column 1 in Table 5. Column 2 adds 2 digit occupation ﬁxed eﬀects while column 3 adds
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to column 1. Column 4 and 5 change the measure of wage in the left-hand side by considering respectively the logarithm
of total ﬁxed pay per hours (i.e. when incentive and overtime pays are excluded) and the logarithm of total gross annual revenue. Column
6 uses the logarithm of R&D expenditure over employment as a measure of R&D.
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Table B6: Robustness to using diﬀerent measures of wages
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
Income Total hourly
pay
Fixed hourly
pay
Total pay
(inc.
incentive)
Fixed pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R˜ft 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
× Int. skill 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
× Low-skill 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.011*** 0.058*** 0.014*** 0.056***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender 0.037*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.139***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Full-Time 0.099*** 0.790*** 0.849*** 0.784***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Int-skill dummy -0.356*** -0.294*** -0.281*** -0.284***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Low-skill dummy -0.564*** -0.537*** -0.494*** -0.504***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Initial Wage 0.410*** 0.457*** 0.407*** 0.417***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Fixed Effects
Geo-Year X X X X
R2 0.709 0.627 0.742 0.615
Observations 612,661 608,851 612,871 608,544
Notes: This table is similar to the last column of Table 2 but uses diﬀerent measures of wages to
construct the dependent variable. Column 1 uses the logarithm of total hourly earnings, column 2
uses the logarithm of the basic (ﬁxed) hourly wages, column 3 uses the logarithm of the total weekly
earning and column 4 uses the logarithm of annual gross earnings. Control variables deﬁnition and
construction are given in Table A7. Ordinary Least Square regression including multiplicative
travel to work area and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at
the ﬁrm level are computed to indicate the level of signiﬁcance: ***, ** and * for 0.01, 0.05 and
0.1 levels of signiﬁcance.
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Table B7: Testing diﬀerent functions of R&D
Dependent variable: ln(wijkft)
R&D function log(1 + x
l
) log(1 + x) x
l
H
(
x
l
)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R˜ft 0.000 -0.002** 0.000* -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
× Int. skill 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.000** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
× Low-skill 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.069***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Full-Time 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Int-skill dummy -0.327*** -0.335*** -0.300*** -0.328***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.01)
Low-skill dummy -0.547*** -0.555*** -0.540*** -0.548***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011)
Initial Wage 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.430*** 0.429***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Fixed Effects
Geo-Year X X X X
R2 0.699 0.699 0.698 0.699
Observations 612,871 612,871 612,871 612,871
Notes: This table presents the coeﬃcient on the function of R&D intensity when estimating
the same model as in the last column of Table 2 but replacing the log of R&D per employee
by alternative functions of this variable. Each line corresponds to a diﬀerent functional form.
Hyperbolic function is H(x) = ln(x +
√
x2 + 1). Ordinary Least Square regression including
additive individual and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Ordinary Least Square regression including multi-
plicative travel to work area and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the ﬁrm level are computed to indicate the level of signiﬁcance: ***, ** and * for
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of signiﬁcance.
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C Theoretical Appendix
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To measure the complete eﬀect of innovation, let us consider how equilibrium wages
react to a continuous increase in z (hence in λz wich corresponds to an upward shift
of Eφ [λ]). For notation simplicity, let us consider that zmax = 1 which implies that
λz = z.
We have:
dwq(z)
dz
=
dwq(z)
dλz
=
1
4C
[(
Q− 1) (QL − 1)λz + Q+QL − 2
2
]
=
q(λz)− qL
2
(Q− 1) + dq(λz)
dz
Q− 1
2
λz
and:
dwQ(z)
dz
=
dwQ(z)
dλz
=
(Q−QL)
2
[
(qL − 1) + λz
2C
(QL − 1) + 1
4C
]
=
Q−QL
2
[
(q − 1) + λz dq(λz)
dz
]
The inequality
dwq(z)
dz
>
dwQ(z)
dz
then results from the fact that ∀z:
1. (q(λz)− qL)(Q− 1) > (Q−QL)(q(λz)− 1);
2. dq(λz)
dz
= dq(λz)
dλz
> 0;
3. (Q− 1) > (Q−QL).
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We have:
dwq(λ, z)
dz
=
[
λ(Q− 1) + 1](dφ(λ, z)
dz
(q(λ, z)− qL) + φ(λ, z)dq(λ, z)
dz
)
and
dwQ(z)
dz
=
(
Q−QL
) ∫ 1
0
(
[λ(q(λ, z)− 1) + 1] dφ(λ, z)
dz
+ φ(λ, z)λ
dq(λ, z)
dz
)
dλ
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The proposition then follows from the following facts:
1. dφ(λ,z)
λ
> 0 and dφ(λ,z)
dz
> 0, which imply that dq(λ,z)
dz
> 0
2. (Q−QL) < (q − qL) and Q > q.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We start from the maximization problem (recall that the optimal value of Q is Q:
max−→q
(
Π˜(~q)−
∫ 1
0
C(λ) (q(λ)− qL)2 dλ
)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
(q(λ)− qL) dλ ≤ T,
If ν denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time constraint, then the
optimal value of q(λ) is:
q∗(λ) = qL +max{0, φ(λ, z)λ(QL − 1) + 1
4C
− ν
2C
}.
Let
g(λ) = φ(λ, z)
λ(QL − 1) + 1
4C
.
The function g is clearly increasing in λ and g(0) = φ(0,z)
4C
and g(1) = φ(1,z)QL
4C
.
Then for each value of z, there exists a cutoﬀ value λ¯ such that when λ ≤ λ¯, then
q∗(λ) = qL and the ﬁrm outsources this task. This cutoﬀ value is simply determined
by:24
g(λ¯) =
ν
2C
=⇒ φ(λ¯, z) λ¯(QL − 1) + 1
2
= ν.
To determine the value of ν, we use the fact that the constraint is binding, so we
must have:
T = qL +
∫ 1
λ¯
g(λ)dλ− ν(1− λ¯)
2C
= qL +
∫ 1
λ¯
g(λ)dλ− g(λ¯)(1− λ¯).
From here, we will assume that φ(λ, z) = (1 + z)λz and z ∈ N. This implies that:∫ 1
λ¯
g(λ)dλ =
z + 1
z + 2
(QL − 1)
4C
(1− λ¯z+2) + (1− λ¯
z+1)
4C
we get λ¯ to be the solution of the equation:
4C(T − qL) = z + 1
z + 2
(QL − 1)(1− λ¯z+2) + (1− λ¯z+1)− λ¯z(1− λ¯)(z + 1)
(
λ¯(QL − 1) + 1
)
(6)
24There is always one and only one value of λ¯ for each value of z. However, this value is not
necessarily bound to the [0, 1] interval. If λ¯ < 0, then we shall consider that there is no outsourcing.
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We want to show that λ¯ increases with z.
Example 3. Consider the case of two firms A and B. Firm A is not innovative:
z = 0 whereas Firm B is innovative with z = 1.
Hence in firm A the outsourcing equation (6) yields:
λ¯A = 1−
√
8C(T − qL)
QL − 1
whereas in Firm B the outsourcing equation (6) yields a λ¯B which satisfies:
4C(T − qL) = (1− λ¯)2
(
1 +
2(QL − 1)
3
(2λ¯+ 1)
)
Since for all λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
1 +
2(QL − 1)
3
(2λ+ 1) >
QL − 1
2
,
then we must have (1− λ¯A)2 > (1− λ¯B)2 which implies λ¯B > λ¯A.
Note that a necessary condition for A to outsource is that:
qL <
(
T − QL − 1
8C
)
and similarly for B:
qL <
(
T − 1 + 2QL
12C
)
<
(
T − QL − 1
8C
)
In other words, if the outside quality qL is too low then firms won’t outsource. The
propensity to outsource also increases with the training cost and with the tightness of
the capacity constraint is tight inversely measured by T .
More generally, and as long as z ∈ N, the outsourcing condition (6) becomes:
4C(T − qL) = (1− λ¯)2
[
z + 1
z + 2
(QL − 1)
z+1∑
i=0
iλ¯i−1 +
z∑
i=0
iλ¯i−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
uz(λ¯)
where uz(λ¯) is increasing in z and always positive when λ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. This ensures that
λ¯ is increasing with z, which completes the proof.
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C.4 Extension to multiple workers in the same task
We now consider the more general case with n ≥ 1 workers in low-skilled occupa-
tions and m ≥ 1 workers in high-skilled occupations. To determine the equilibrium
wages resulting from ex-post negotiation, we rely on Stole and Zwiebel (1996). In
their framework, if the nth worker in a low-skilled occupation refuses the wage oﬀer
wqn, then the remaining n − 1 worker in a low-skilled occupation renegotiate a wage
w
q
n−1. By induction, this provides a generic expression for the two equilibrium wages
wqn,m(Q, q, λ) and w
Q
n,m(Q, q) (up to a constant in q, Q and λ):
wqn,m(Q, q, λ) = λφ(λ)
q(λ)− qL
n(n+ 1)
n∑
i=0
iQmq(λ)i−1 +
(1− λ)
2
(q(λ)− qL)φ(λ)
wQn,m(Q, q) =
Q−QL
m(m+ 1)
m∑
i=0
i
∫ 1
0
q(λ)nQi−1λφ(λ)dλ+
1− Eφ [λ]
2
(Q−QL),
when assuming equal bargaining powers for workers in high- and low-skilled occupa-
tions. Note that this extension nests the baseline version of the model since taking
n = 1 and m = 1 yields the same results as above.
Let us now assume that we are in the toy case, that is, φ(λ) = 1 if λ = λz ≡ zzmax
and 0 otherwise. In that case:
wqn,m(Q, q, λz) = λz
q − qL
n(n+ 1)
n∑
i=0
iQmqi−1 +
1− λz
2
(q − qL)
wQn,m(Q, q, λz) = λz
Q−QL
m(m+ 1)
m∑
i=0
iqnQi−1 +
1− λz
2
(Q−QL),
(7)
The case where n = 1 and m = 2
In this case, we have:
∂w
q
1,2(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
=
(q − qL)(Q2 − 1)
2
and
∂w
Q
1,2(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
=
(Q−QL)
2
(
q(1 + 2Q)
3
− 1
)
,
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and since Q > q implies q(1+2Q) < Q(Q+2Q), then q(1+2Q)
3
−1 < Q2−1, which,
combined with the assumption that (Q−QL) < (q − qL), immediately implies that:
∂w
q
1,2(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
>
∂w
Q
1,2(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
.
The case where n = 2 and m = 1
In this case, we have:
∂w
q
2,1(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
=
(q − qL)(Q+ 2qQ)
6
−q − qL
2
and
∂w
Q
2,1(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
=
(Q−QL)(q − 1)
2
,
Then a suﬃcient condition for
∂wq
2,1(Q,q,λz)
∂λz
>
∂wQ
2,1(Q,q,λz)
∂λz
is that Q + 2qQ > 3q
which in turn is always true since Q > q > 1.
The case where n = m
For a given n ≥ 2, a suﬃcient condition for ∂wqn,n(Q,q,λz)
∂λz
>
∂wQn,n(Q,q,λz)
∂λz
is:
1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
i=0
iQnqi−1 >
1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
i=0
iqnQi−1,
which is equivalent to:
n∑
i=0
i
qn−i+1
>
n∑
i=0
i
Qn−i+1
,
which is automatically true as long as n ≥ 2.
The case where n < m
By induction, for a given n > 2, if we assume that ∂w
q
n,m(Q,q,λz)
∂λz
>
∂wQn,m(Q,q,λz)
∂λz
, then
it is easy to show that:
1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
i=0
iQm+1qi−1 >
1
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
m+1∑
i=0
iqnQi−1,
and therefore that
∂wqn,m(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
>
∂w
Q
n,m+1(Q, q, λz)
∂λz
.
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